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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the relationship between 
thinking dominated by perception and thinking guided by 
use of consistent logical structures, and the bearing this 
relationship has on two approaches to problem-solving: 
empirical and deductive. It was suggested by Piaget's 
theory of cognitive development, which is characterized 
by a genetic epistemological approach, that is, the 
investigation of the laws under which knowledge evolves. 
1 
'iaget defines consecutive modes of thinking in terms 
of logical forms as models of operation of the mind. 
Thus thinking unfolds in several stages, each character-
ized by a precursor of the ultimate abstract logic. In the 
intuitive stage, logic (operational thinking) is absent; 
thinking is prelogical and bound by perception. The suc-
ceeding stage of concrete operations refers to the onset of 
logical thinking, which is applied to discrete, concrete sit-
uations. The child demonstrates some characteristic of a 
1 J. Piaget. Psychology of intelligence. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950. 
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given stage by solving problems typical of that develop-
mental step. Intuitive thinking is reflected in an empiri-
cal approach, while operational thinking is reflected in a 
dedUctive approach. 
These two successive modes of thinking have 
been investigated in studies on children lacking operation-
al structures. 2'3, 4,5 Attempts to teach the subjects to 
solve problems involving logical operations led, at best, 
to empirical learning. Although the newly acquired skill 
was correct for the particular situation, it lacked the 
underlying logical principles. This empirical approach to 
problem-solving was found to persist throughout the intui-
tive stage, being replaced by deductive problem-solving in 
the concrete operational stage. Piaget6 points out that 
2 P. Greco. L1 apprentissage dans une situation a struc-
/ ' ture operatoire concrete. Etudes Ep. Gen., vol. YII, 
p. 68-182. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959. 
3 A. Morf. Apprentissage d rune structure logique concrete. 
Etudes Ep. Gen., vol. ~' p. 15-83. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1959. 
4 J. Smedslund. Apprentissages des notions de la conser-, 
vation et de la transitivite du poids. Etudes Ep. Gen., 
vol. IX, p. 85-124. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
-France, 1959. 
5 J. F. Wohlwill. Un essai d 1 apprentissage dans le domaine 
de la conservation du nombre. Etudes Ep. Gen., vol. ~' 
p. 125-135. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959. 
6 J. Piaget. Apprentissage et connaissance, II. Etudes Ep. 
~., vol. ~' p. 159-188. Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1959. 
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such an outcome is to be expected, since logical structures 
cannot be ~~rely taught, they are learned only when there 
is readiness for a reorganization into operational systems. 
Most studies on the relationship between intuitive 
and operational thinking consider only one variable: the 
absence of operational thinking. The question then arises: 
is this the ~nly variable in relation to which perceptually 
bound thinking should be considered? Could not such think-
ing with its empirical approach persist even after more 
advanced forms of thinking have emerged? Furthermere, in 
these studies the alternatives--to rely either on perceptu-
ally dominated or on logically guided thinking--were not 
present un~er controlled conditions. The question is thus 
extended: if given the opportunity, would perception pre-
dominate even in the presence of operational thinking? 
The relationship between perceptually dominated 
and logically guided thinking was therefore examined in a 
situation where perceptual configurations and logic com-
~ 
peted. The investigation was carried out during a period 
in the child's development which Piaget7 has described as 
7 J. Piaget. Apprentissage et eonnaissance, II. Etudes EP· Gen., vol. ~ , p. 165. Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1959. 
-4-
transitional between intuitive and operational thinking. 
The subjects, however, demonstrated having the rudiments 
of operational thinking but differed in their reliance on 
empirical laws in problem-salving. The inferences drawn 
from the results were intended to clarify further the 
nature of cognitive development, as viewed by a genetic 
epistemological approach. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In this chapter, the present study is related 
to certain aspects of Piaget's theory of cognitive develop-
ment. The review of the literature is therefore limited 
to a brief exposition and discussion of this theoretical 
framework along the following lines: perception in the 
context of cognitive development; the concept of sue-
cessive modes of thinking; pertinent earlier studies; 
and relevant experimental methodology. 
Perception in the context of cognitive development 
At all levels of cognitive functioning, Pia-
8 
get distinguishes between a logical, or "operational" 
aspect and a perceptual, or "figurative" aspect. Percep-
tion unfolds separately but not independently of logic. 
8 / J. Piaget. Les mecanismes perceptifs. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1961. 
-5-
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Piaget assumes an interaction between the two aspects ~nd 
considers that the successive forms of perception are 
therefore not a direct outcome of the previous ones. At 
each step, new forms are determined by the interaction with 
contemporaneous logical functions. This interaction even-
tually results in perceptual activity and enriches percep-
tion while decreasing its deceiving effects. 
Piaget qualifies his stand further by contrast-
ing it with the unitary theory of cognitive functioning as 
expounded by Koehler and Wertheimer, where there is the 
implication of a linear relation between the perceptual 
and the higher intellectual structures to which it directly 
9 10 
gives rise. More recently Michotte most clearly &xem-
plifies the unitary point of view. He holds that certain 
meanings are intrinsic, present on the perceptual plane 
before they are actually acquired through experiences. 
While acknowledging the learned meanings of much that is 
perceived, in his phenomenological approach Michotte can 
also see intrinsic meanings in sensory structures. As 
9 / J. Piaget. Les mecanismes perceptifs. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1961, p. 353-440. 
10 
A. Michotte. Rapport de A. Michotte. La perception. 
Symposium de l'association de psychologie scientifique 
de la langue fra~caise, Louvain, 1953, p. 31-45. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1955. 
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opposed to this approach, Piaget points out that perception 
is deceiving and that its misleading qualities wane enly 
through interaction with logical thinking. 
In the absence of the unifying stability of 
logical structures, perception, as an intrinsic aspect of 
the child's-relation to the world, contaminates the first 
attempts at thinking. The unreliability of early percep-
tion stems from its "centering" effects. On the one hand, 
centering refers to the tendency of sense organs to move in 
one direction at once. On the other hand, centering is 
seen when prominent portions of the figure (e.g., large 
areas in the visual field) capture the attention with con-
11 
sequent di~tortions. Hence thinking is at the mercy of 
12 
changes resulting from successive centerings. The child 
is egocentric, and everything becomes relative to his per-
13 
ception of things. 
Piaget's position on perception contrasts with 
other current theorists primarily in his view that percep-
11 
12 
D. E. Berlyne. Recent developments in Piaget 1 s work. 
~· l• ~· Psycho!., 1957, gz. 
B. Inhelder. Some aspects of Piaget•s ge~etic approach 
to cognition. Paper read at the Conference of Intellec-
tive Processes Research, Dedham, Massachusetts, April, 
1960. 
13 / J. Piaget. Les mecanismes perceptifs. ~aris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1961, p. 356. 
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tion, with its centering effects and consequent distortions, 
can hinder thinking until there is some reliance on stored 
information through the development of logic. 
Successive modes of thinking 
The constant interaction between the logical and 
perceptual aspects of cognition can be best understood in 
the context of successive modes of thinking. Piaget's 
perspective in tracing stage after stage of thinking is 
known as "genetic epistemology". Whereas the philosophical 
. . 
epistemologist's query is, 11What is knowledge?", Piaget, 
' '• 
the genetic epistemologist, asks, "Under what laws does 
knowledge develop and change'l 11 He defines cognitive growth 
'• 
in terms of logical forms, as models of operation of the 
mind. The ultimate form of thinking, reached only during 
and after adolescence, is characterized by an equilibrium, 
stable, mobile, and encompassing a wide field in an indivi-
dual's experience. 14 It is never quite perfectly attained, 
but may be regarded as a sort of mathematical limit. In 
problem-solving it is reflected by a deductive approach. 
Piaget searches for the roots of logical think-
14 J. Piaget. Logique et equilibre dans les comportements 
du sujet. Etudes E£• ~., vol. !l, p. 25-117. Paris: 
Presses Universitaire de France, 1957. 
ing in biological principles, as organism and environment 
reach their first form~ of equilibrium through assimilation 
and accomodation. He follows logic througho~t the child's 
cognitive development, and sees the various incomplete 
equilibria as temporary overall halts where cognitive 
changes are integrated. These periods of integration of 
each successive mode of thinking are the stages of develop-
ment. 
The notion of stages is essential to Piaget's 
15 
understanding of the development of cognition. They 
define the successive boundaries of intelligence, des-
cribing the childts behaviour system and reflecting the 
rules by which the child operates at any particular phase. 
During the pre-verbal period of life the child 
develops the blueprints of logic in action at a sensory-
motor level. During the next period, the preconceptual 
and intuitive stage, he relearns at a symbolic level wha~ 
he knew in a world of concrete objects and actions. This 
new reorganization also incorporates an intuitive logic· 
that later leads to operational thinking: 
l5 Murchison. A history of psychology in autobiography. 
Vol. IV. An autobiography by Jean Fiaget. Clark 
University Press, 1952. 
• • • there is new structuring • • • we 
see gradual coordination of representa-
t.ive relations and thus growing concept-
ualization, which leads the child from 
the symbolic or preconceptual phase t~6 the beginnings of the operation • • • 
-10-
Intuitive thinking still lacks unifying stabili-
ty. During this time the child uncritically accepts the 
dictates of whichever aspect of change he happens to per-
ceive. During the intuitive stage, thinking seems to be 
conspicuously bound by perceptual configurations: 
••• the limitations are obvious. 
Intuition being a direct relationship 
between a schemata of inte~lalized 
action and the perception of objects, 
results only in configurations 
11 centered11 on this relationship.l7 
An example ef the child's 11 centering11 his 
attention on an immediate perceptual relation is seen when 
one of two clay balls, acknowledged to weigh the same, is 
transformed into a long, thin sausage. Bound by perceptual 
configuration, the child insists that the sausage now weighs 
more than the ball because it is longer, or less, because 
it is thinner. Such a performance is to be expected on 
this typical conservation-of-weight task, where the empiri-
cal approach can be seen in the forming of an ad hoc rule. 
16 J. Piaget. Psychology of intellisence,. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950, p. 129. 
17 Ibid., p. 138. 
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As th~nking evolves from intuitive .forms and 
11 perceptual relativity" to the intellectual relativity of 
the more advanced cognitive forms, a corrective factor ap-
pears: "decentralization11 • It results from the comparisons 
and transpositions of perceptual activity, and provides 
flexible supports needed for launching the operational 
mechanisms. 
The rudiments of logical thinking gain primacy 
during the next phase of cognitive development which is 
characterized by operational thinking. Perception is sub-
ordinated as the child takes into account other sources of 
information apart from those predominantly ~erceptual. A 
reliance on operational thinking can compensate for changes 
in perception. 
As defined by Piaget,18 "operations are actions 
which are internalizable, reversible, and coordinated into 
systems by laws which apply to the system as a whole. 11 
They lead to mobile reversibility, stability, and wideness 
of field that allows the extension of thought into the 
world far beyond the moment·ary ranges of the individual's 
senses or even life span.19 
18 J. Piaget. Lo5ic and pszcholOSY• New~York: Basic 
Books, 1957, p. 8. 
l9 D. E. Berlyne. Recent developments in Piaget's work. 
~· ~· ~· Psychol., 1957, gr. 
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In both concrete and abstract situations, oper-
ations are characterized by their organization into systems 
I 
I 
of "groupings". The "groupings" depend on five simultaneous 
laws, the definition of one involving reference to the others. 
One of them is "transitive combinativity11 , by which is 
meant that the combination of two successive operations is 
equivalent to a third operation. 20 Piaget locates transiti-
vity among the operational groupings as follows: 
In practice, the operational groupings 
••• lead to the following structures. 
First of all they lead to the logical 
operations of fitting classes together 
• • • and of serializing asymmetrical 
relations. Hence the discovery of 
transitivity which permits of the 
deductions: A=B, B=C, therefore 
A=C.21 
When applied to judgment of quantity and measurement in 
general, transitive combinativity can be expressed as: 
(A)B) & (B> C) :> (A) C), meaning that if A is greater 
than B, and B is greater than C, then A is greater than 
c.22 
20 J. Piaget. Ps~cholo~y of intellisence. London: 
Routledge and egan au!, 1956. p. 143. 
21 Ibid. 
22 M. D. s. Brain. Ontogeny of certain logical opera-
tions. Psychol. Monosr. 1959, Ll.No. 5 (Whole No. 
475). 
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In a typical situation where the child demonstrates 
having acquired transitivity as one aspect of the more gen-
eral ability to perform logical operations, the following 
experiment is performed with reference to weight: in ~ront 
of the subject an ~bject A and an object B are put on a 
balance scale; the subject is asked to compare their weights; 
the same is done for the object B now paired with an object a; 
then without any further actual weighing, the objects A and a 
are placed in front of the child and he is asked to infer 
the relative weights of A and a. The deductive approach 
is reflected in the use of relevant information from previ-
ous steps combined with the perceptual configuration, resul-
ting in the final correct judgment about A and c. 
Pertinent earlier studies 
Piaget and Lambercier23 showed that perceptual 
distortions, e.g., in overestimating the size of a stimulus 
on which attention is constantly focussed, can be automati-
cally corrected by the interaction with logical operations. 
They found that subjects in the intuitive stage overestima-
ted a nearby rod A when judging its length with reference 
to a distal, equal sized rod C, even though provided with 
a movable rod B which could help compare A to a. By 
23 J. Piaget and M. Lambercier. Transpositions perceptives 
et transitivite operatoire dans les comparaisons en 
profondeur. ~~ Psychol., Geneve, 1943-1946, 30-31~ 
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applying transitivity of length, subjects in the concrete 
operational stage approached the problem deductively; they 
used logical operations (A = B and B = c, therefore A = C) 
in order to obtain the correct answer. 
Expe~iments on teaching logical structures 
24 demonstrated, according to Piaget, that although not 
independent of experience, they are acquired only when 
previous prelogical structures are readily given up. Using 
transitivity and conservation, experimenters tried to teach 
children who did not possess concrete operational thinking 
how to solve problems deductively. On the whole, they 
found that if learning occurred at ail, there was still a 
great reliance on perceptually bound'thinking. Even when 
correct responses were finally given, they were based on 
responses to empirical data; the principles were not under-
stood. Smedslund25 found some learning of conservation-of-
weight which indirectly led to improvement in the performance 
ot t~ansitivity-of-weight tasks. He·attributed the latter 
24 J. Piaget. Apprentissage et-connaissance. I and II. 
Etudes~· ~., vol. !II and !• Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1959. 
25 J. Smedslund. Apprentissage des notions de la conser-
vation et de la transitivitedu poids. Etudes~·~., 
vol. ~' p. 125-135. Paris: Presses Universita1res de 
France, 1959. 
-J-5-
result to a cognitive reorganization necessary for the 
learning of logical ~perations. In a more extensive study, 
he found markedly negative results in direct teaching of 
transitivity: 
27 
The negative results on direct transi-
tivity learning illustrates a situation 
where no cognitive reorganization occurs 
and where there is not even empirical 
learning.26 
Smedslund considered that the normal development from 
non-conservation to conservation is also a transition 
from a perception-bound concept to one less dependent 
on immediate perception. He therefore tried to improve 
the teaching by extinguishing responses depending on 
visual cues, but again had negative results. 
In all these experiments, the relation between 
perception-bound and logical thinking was viewed in rela-
tion to one major variable: the absence of concrete oper-
ational thinking. Furthermore, the reliance on empirical 
laws was considered uniform in all childre~ and not indepen-
dently varied. 
2 
27 
J. Smedslund. Learnin~ and e~uilibration. Unpublished 
manuscript. Oslo, 195 , p. 3 • 
J. Smedslund. The acquisition of conservation of sub-
stance and weight in children. Introduction, Scand. J. 
Psychol., 1961, g, 11-20. -
-16-
Experimental methodolosz 
The methodology of genetic epistemology raises 
problems about using a purely verbal approach. Piaget•s 
method in the beginning was not only verbal, but also non-
standardized, and seldom allowed for replication. His 
flexible, unstandardized method of inquiring into the 
reasons for wrong answers is illustrated in his writings 
from 1921 to 1925. 28 , 29,30,3l This 11methode clinique11 has 
been greatly revised and now allows for replication. It 
is still a verbal "interrogation" method, and as such has 
' raised certain objections. Brai~,32 in discussing these, 
points out the diagnostic nature of Piaget 1 s questioning 
technique, by which he tries to find a process he knows 
28 J. 'Piaget. 
New Jersey: 
29,J. Piaget. 
30 
31 
New Jersey: 
J. Piaget. 
causality. 
1960. 
J. Piaget. 
New York: 
Judgment and reasoning in the child. 
Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1959. 
The child's- conception of the world. 
Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1960. 
The child •·a conception of :gh:y'sical 
New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 
The lan~a~e and thought of the child. 
Meridian Book, 1955·. 
32 M. D •. s. Bra1.n. Problems and issues in the study of 
conceptual development. Paper read at the Conference 
of Intellective Processes Research, Dedham, Massachu-
setts, Aprit, 1960. 
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may be there. In this way his results become illustrations 
' 
and suggestive observations. Furthermore, Brain disting-
uishes between behavioral and verbal manifestations of a 
concept, which become obscured in Piaget 1 s technique. 
Vocabulary development may well be a 
factor in many of Piaget•s experiments. 
Its confounding effects cannot be el-
minated unless nonverbal methods of 
presenting the tasks to the s•s are 
used • • • No theory which postulates 
levels of conceptual development can 
be regarded as definitely established 
when the supporting data are obtained 
through extensive verbal communication 
with S's who differ in their ability to 
verbalize.33 
This discrepancy in age norms, for the appearance 
of different forms of operational thinking, suggests that 
differences in results may depend u~on differences in the 
loosely defined verbal methods. Brain's non-verbal ap-
proach consisted of administering transitivity-of-length 
tasks by a discrimination method; he thus found that the 
operation was available at an age at least two years prior 
to the norm where Piaget located its emergence. The study 
was inconclusive since a direct comparison to norms obtained 
by Piaget's method seemed impossible; Brain had no compar-
ison with a parallel control group to which the identical 
tasks could have been presented. 
33 
M. D. s. Brain. 
Psychol. Monogr. 
Ontogeny of certain logical operations. 
1959, !21 No. 5 (Whole No. 475). 
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Hence a satisfactory experimental design for 
purposes of direct comparison should include both a Brain 
discrimination non-verbal type of approach and a Piaget 
interrogation verbal one. 
To recapitulate, experimental attempts to teach 
a deductive approach to problem-solving fail in the absence 
of operational thinking; children cling to perceptual 
centering or at best apply empirical solutions. It is 
further shown that in the presence of concrete operational 
thinking, there is an imposition of logical thinking on 
perceptual organization in a purely perceptual task. What 
has not been examined is the imposition of perception-die-
tated thinking on a deductive task once concrete operational 
thinking has been reached. 
Piaget's theoretical, but non-experimental, for-
mulations indicate that once a more advanced level of 
cognitive development is established, older forms of think-
ing lose their emphasis. On this same point Inhelder34 
states: 
34 B. Inhelder. Discussion. 
of Intellective Processes 
setts, April, 1960. 
Paper read at the Conference 
Research, Dedham, Massachu-
• • • once the child has reached the 
structure of mental operations charac-
teristic of a given stage, the child 
need not refer back to the process used 
in the formation of the prior stage 
• • • the earlier processes seem aban-
doned, with the elaboration of newer 
ones • • • and once he has built a 
particular structure, he does not seem 
to go back to any former structure. 
It is known that the adult relies on stored 
information, using premises, even when confronted with per-
ceptual evidence that strongly contradicts it. Do children 
who have just reached this ability for operational thinking 
react likewise when faced with the same contradictions? 
Within this context, the following issues arise: 
1. What is the relation between perceptually 
bound and logically modeled thinking once concrete opera-
tional thinking is apparent? 
2. How will children capable of operational 
thinking, but in some areas still relying on ad hoc empiri-
cal laws, respond in situations where perceptual configura-
tions directly contradict logic? 
3. If Piaget's verbal interrogation and Brain's 
non-verbal discrimination techniques are used in parallel 
procedures, how will the results compare? 
CHAPT~ III 
THE EXPERIMENT 
In this chapter a general hypothesis is elabo-
rated into three specific ones. The measures used in the 
experiment are justified prior to a description of the 
actual method by which the hypothesis is tested. 
Hypotheses and Predictions 
From a consideration of the issues raised at 
' 
the end of the previous chapter, a general hypothesis is 
stated: 
The supremacy of misleading perception is a 
function of empirical orientation during the concrete 
operational stage. lt is more evident in investigations 
that use interrogation rather than discrimination methods. 
This general hypothesis incorporates three specific ones: 
-20-
-21-
In the concrete operational stage, when solv-
1ng problems that offer both perceptual and logical 
cues: 
1. Children with an empirical orientation err 
more often than children with a deductive orientation. 
2. Children with an empirical orientation make 
proportionately more of their errors when perception 
directly contradicts logic, than do children with a 
deductive orientation. 
3. Children rely on logical operations more 
often when the tasks are presented by a discrimination 
method than when they are presented by an interrogation. 
method. 
Measures 
These hypotheses were approached by considering 
one aspect of misleading perception--the primary reliance 
on the perception of size, and one characteristic of logical 
(operational) thinking--transitivity as applied to weight. 
In addition, the age range was limited to five to seven 
years. This age range was suggested in the literature as 
the transition from the intuitive to the concrete operational 
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~tag e. 
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According to Piaget II • • • the period from 5 to 
7 years marks the transition between preoperational struc-
tures and concrete operations ••• 11 .All subjects demon-
strated some rudiments of concrete operational thinking by 
performing correctly on two typical tasks of the concrete 
operational stage: transitivity-of-weight and conservation-
of•weight problems. 
Subjects differed in the explanations they gave 
to their correct solutions on the conservation-of-weight 
problems. These explanations, categorized as 11 P" and 11 811 
36 . . . . 
according to Smedlund's norms, defined the first indepen-
dent variable: an empirical orientation and a deductive 
orientation. Two groups, named respectively the P group 
and the S group, were chosen to represent this variable. 
The two types of explanations were thus defined: 
11P11 explanations: all explanations that direct-
ly or indirectly referred to observable features in the 
present situation. 
35 
36 
J. Piaget. .Apprentissage et connaissance. II. Etudes 
~· ~., vol. ~~ p. 165. Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1959. Liberal translation by the present 
author from the following French text: "• •• celle de 5 
a 7 ana qui marque la transition entre lea structures 
preoperatoire et les operations t concretes t • • • fl 
J. Smedslund. Learnin~ and equilibration. Unpublished 
manuscript. Oslo, 195 • 
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"S" explanations: all explanations that directly 
or indirectly referred to previous events in the same test 
item. , 
Smedslund also reported that in an interjudge 
reliability test in scoring 11P" and 11 S" explanations, there 
w~s complete agreement on 11 S11 type of explanations and 96% 
to 97% overall agreement. In his studies there was a high 
positive correlation between correct judgments and 11 8 11 
explanations, but a number of subjects who gave correct 
judgments gave 111? 11 explanations. It seemed that th.ese 11P11 
subjec~s, while able to give correct answers, were still 
relying exclusively on empirical data, and approached the 
task empirically. 
Using conservation-of-weight in relation to 
transitivity-of-weight was suggested by Smedslund, who 
found that they develop closely together, but "• •• do not 
seem to be symptoms of the same underlying grouping of 
11 37 operations • • • 
The mode of presentation of test tas·ks--the 
interrogation and the discrimination methods--represented 
the dichotomized second independent variable. 
37 J. Smedslund. Learning and equilibration. Unpublished 
manuscript. Oslo, 1959, p.75. 
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The interrogation method was operationally 
defined following Smedslund's verbal questioning proce-
dure,38 in which explicit reference was made to the relative 
weight of the test objects. 
The discrimination method resembled the g~neral 
discrimination method used in learning experiments, and was 
the one used by Brain. 39 This method omitted all direct 
reference to the fact that one of the two objects simultan-
eously weighed on the balance scale was heavier. The sub-
jects discriminated the heavier object by consistently 
associating its choice with some sort of "yes" cue. Brain 
thought that in Piaget's method, and by implication in 
Smedslund1 s, motivation was not sustained, therefore he had 
his·subjects find candy when responding correctly. He 
observed, however, that after a while some subjects lost 
interest in searching for this comestible. Since the pres-
ent study required the interest of all children at all times, 
tokens were provided which could be exchanged for a series 
of trinkets and hobby materials. This was suggested by 
40 Bijou and Sturges; they underlined the advantage of allow-
38 J. Smedslund. Learning and equilibration. Unpublished 
manuscript. Oslo, 1959, p. 47-48. 
39 M. D. s. Brain. Ontogeny of certain logical operations. 
Psychol. Monogr., 1959, Z2· No. 5 (Whole No. 475). 
4o s. w. Bijou and Sturges. Positive reinforcers for ex-
perimental studies with children. Child Develpm., 1959, 
.iQ., 151-170. 
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ing the child to manipulate reinforcers whose effective-
ness usually was influenced by age, historical factors 
and local interests. They also pointed out that this 
cafeteria style offered variety among reinforcers, which 
helped to forestall satiation and a decline of motivation. 
The quantification of the performance on the 
experimental transit.ivity tasks which also allowed for 
perceptual centering, served as the operational measure of 
the dependent variable. 
Method 
Apparatus 
At all steps of the experiment, a precision, 
avoirdupois, Pelouze R-47 balance scale was used. It had 
two sides and no calibrated weight readings. 
For the conservation-of-weight tasks, eight 
pairs of colored identical balls, in red, green, yellow 
and blue, were made out of 11Modeline 11 modeling clay. 
For the various transitivity-of-weight tasks, 
there were eighty-two objects in six basic geometric 
shapes (Fig. 1: square, cylinder, triangle, oblong, circle 
and hexagon), of three different sizes, with linear dimen-
sion in a one, two, three ratio. They were painted nine 
assorted colors (white, pink, orange, red, yellow, blue, 
-. 
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green, brown and black) of auto dyes resistent to peeling 
and dulling. Each geometric shape had hollow compartments 
covered by sliding doors, in which tokens for the dis-
crimination method could be hidden. The space also allowed 
for a variation in weight by introducing round, flat, lead 
weights, uncalibrated. 
The reward material used with the discrimination 
method included tokens: play-money made of thin, shiny, 
almost weightless material, each with the diameter of a 
u. s. dime. The tokens could be exchanged for trinkets 
and hobby materials. These were attached with elastic 
thread to a 2211 by 28 11 display cardboard, separated into 
four categories bordered off by red lines, each section 
identified by the number of poker chips equal to the number 
of tokens necessary to obtain a prize-objec.t in that section. 
Sub.lects 
In order to test the hypothesis, criteria were 
set in selecting a sample whose ages ranged from five to 
seven years, who were able to solve typical logical prob-
lems and whose orientation could be defined as empirical 
. or deductive. 
In the process of selecting the thirty subjects 
of the experimental sample (N = 30) who met the criteria, 
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236 children were screened. They all came from a suburban, 
middle to upper-middle income group; all subjects were 
attending kindergarten or the first grade in one of three 
elementary schools at the time of data collecting. 
The thirty chosen subjects solved correctly seven 
out of eight conservation-of-weight problems, showing that 
they could reliably deal with this aspect of concrete oper-
ational thinking (seven out of eight correct solutions 
reaches significance on the sign test). Subjects also had 
to show that they could reliably deal with typical transiti-
vity-of-weight problems (six out of six correct solutions 
reaches significance on the sign test). 
The P Grou£. Operationally defined, subjects were 
said to have an empirical orientation if they gave a 11F11 ex-
planation to more than two correct solutions of the conserva-
tion-of-weight problems. Actually most subjects gave P 
eXPlanations to 6 or 7 of the 8 items. Ten subjects (N=lO) 
were assigned to the group in this way and were presented the 
transitivity tasks by the interrogation method, forming the 
P group-interrogation. 
The S Grou~. Operationally defined, subjects 
were said to have a deductive orientation if they gave 11 8 11 
explanations to at least seven of the correct solutions of 
the conservation-of-weight problems. Twenty subjects (N=20) 
:.29-
~ere assigned to the group in this way. Half of these 
subjects (N=lO) were presented with all transitivity tasks 
by the interrogation method, forming the S group-interroga-
tion. The remaining half (N=lO) were presented the transi-
tivity tasks by the discrimination method, forming the s 
group-discrimination. 
Two independent raters, the examiner and a 
psychologist who had little familiarity with the overall 
procedure, .rated children's explanations for their correct 
responses on the conservation-of-weight tasks. There were 
240 responses to be scored as 11 8 11 and 11 P11 in the sample of 
thirty subjects, and there was 100% agreement between the 
two ratere. 
The distribution of "P" and "S" explanations in 
the two groups (Figure #2) seemed to discriminate between 
the two populations, P and S; the subjects who gave many 
11 P11 explanations, gave few nsn explanations, and conversely. 
Random sampling with respect to sex distribution 
was attempted. On inspection, it appeared that there was a 
difference in male.-female distribution in the three groups. 
Therefore the null hypothesis that there was no significant 
difference in sex frequency was tested, comparing the three 
experimental groups. The Fisher Exact Probability Test, 
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whose procedure is described by Siegel, was used. rehe 
. 
null hypothesis was accepted, since the obtained proqabil-
ity of occurrences of this type of distribution was found 
to be greater than 0.05 for all comparisons (Table 1). It 
I 
was concluded that the distribution of male and female was 
not significantly different in the three groups. 
Thera was an attempt at random distribution of 
the ages of children who ranged from five to seven Yrars in 
the experimental groups. In testing whether the ages in the 
three samples came from a common population, with respect 
to age, an analysis of variance and a test of significance 
based upon F distribution were used, as described by, Ed-
42 
wards; the value of F was smaller than one, and not sig-
nificant at the 0.05 probability level (Appendix A). The 
hypothesis of random sampling from a common populat~on, 
with respect to age, was regarded as tenable. 
Procedure 
The experimenter met most subjects i~ a group 
for the first time, and was introduced to them by the class 
teacher. Maximum cooperation was obtained from the school 
1 
42 
s. Siegel. Non-parametric statistics. New York:'1 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Ine., 1956. Chapter 6. 
A. L. Edwards. ~erimental design in ps~cholo~ical 
research. New Yor:! Rinehart & Company, I 5o. c apter 10. 
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TABLE 1 
MALE - FEMALE DISTRIBUTION COMPARED BY THE FISHER 
EXACT PROBABILITY TEST 
P GROUP - INTERROGATION 
S GROUP - INTERROGATION 
P.) 0 .• 05 
S-GROUP- INTERROGATION 
S·GROUP·- DISCRIMINATION 
p ) o.os 
MALE FEMALE 
4 
7 
6 
3 
MALE FEMALE 
7 
6 
3 
4 
-33-
system and at all times from the children. 
All children were seen individually. When the 
examining room was at some distance from the classroom, 
each child was escorted by the examiner. When testing took 
place in an adjoining room, the teacher sent the children 
next door to the examiner. 
There were four experiment~l sessions, lasting 
from fifteen minutes to half an hour, depending on the 
child's speed in responding, irrelevant chatter, and 
comments about the examiner. In the first two sessions, 
-
the sample of 30 subjects was selected according to the 
criteria. During the third and fourth sessions, the 
actual experiment was carried out. 
The First Session. This was the pretest session 
during which the conservation-of-weight tasks were used 
for the purpose of selecting subjects who could deal with 
problems involving logic, and in order to assign them to 
P and S groups. There were three steps: 
a. The use of the scale was shown to the sub-
ject who then had to demonstrate his understanding of the 
process of weighing. At no time did the subject weigh 
things, since care was taken to avoid reliance on kin-
esthetic sensations. The subject was directed to get his 
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information entirely from the scales. 
b. The eight conservation-of-weight tasks were 
then administered. In the typical task, the experimenter 
weighed two clay balls of exactly the same volume, appear-
ance and weight, then transformed one of them into one of 
four shapes: ring, triangle, basket, star. These were 
different in shape, although not grossly different in size, 
from the ball. The eighth task was somewhat irregular, 
sinee the transformed ball was shaped into a "snake", which 
also differed grossly in size from the original ball. Each 
task was accompanied by these instructions: 
See these two balls of clay; watch 
me weigh them • • • what do you think 
••• yes, they both weigh.the same 
• • .• now remember that. (as the two 
balls were removed from the scale, and 
one of them was transformed in f-ront of 
the child) ••• now I'm going to make 
a ••• (something that looks like a 
••• ) Do you think that this ••• 
weighs more than the ball (pointing 
at both objects alternately), or less 
than the ball, or the same as the ball? 
c. After the subject gave the correct answers, 
he was asked 11Why? 11 If he did not respond, the following 
.. 
alternatives were used: 
How could you tell that ••• ? What 
is it that makes you think that ••• ? 
If he still did not respond, the possible burden of 
responsibility for justification was further relieved by 
gentle prodding: "Guess ••• you can do that, just 
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guess ••• ? 11 Ultimately all subjects responded. 
At the end of this session, if qualifying for 
either 111' 11 or 11 S11 samples, the subject was informed about 
his return to the experiment. 
The Second Session. This was the training-
screening session, consisting of three steps. During this 
session further selection of subjects occurred. 
a. Five training-to-weigh tasks were first intro-
duced. 
With the interrogation method, the five pairs of 
training-to-weigh tasks were introduced with the comment: 
I'm going to weigh any two of these 
nicely colored blocks, and I want to 
see whether you can really tell me 
each time which weighs more. 
With the discrimination method on these same 
tasks, the subject was shown a token inside a dummy geom-
etric shape and told: 
I'm going to weigh any two of these 
nicely colored blocks, and this way 
I can help you find a make-believe 
penny. 
The subject was then led to the prize-display cardboard and 
shown how many tokens he would need to obtain a prize. He 
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was encouraged to think of the prize for which he would 
like to work. A wide variety of reinforcers was provided 
as the experiment went along. The increased number of 
opportunities for finding tokens was correlated with a 
greater variety of trinket-hobby objects of increasingly 
larger size. After the first pair of blocks was weighed 
and the subject indicated by pointing, color naming, or 
whatever procedure he preferred, which one 11had the penny", 
the examiner checked in front of the subject to see if 
his choice was correct. If the token was found it was 
given to the subject. If he was wrong he was told: 
There is a way to find out where the 
penny is each time we weigh; you just 
watch carefully. 
Subjects unable to be trained on this simple discrimination 
task were dropped from the discrimination method group. 
b. This was a screening test consisting of six 
typical transitivity-of-weight tasks, in which all three 
objects were of equal size. 
With the interrogation method, the tasks were 
introduced as follows: 
Now, I saw how well you can tell which 
of two things weigh more. In this next 
game, you'll have to tell me again, each 
time I weigh two things, which of the two 
is heavier, but you'll also have to remem-
ber which weighs more. You watch • • • 
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After A and B, paired, then B and C were weighed, the £ub-
ject was asked which was the heavier in comparing A and C, 
which were not weighed together. Following his response, 
A and C were weighed in front of him, to allow him to check 
on the validity of his inference. 
With the discrimination method, the child was 
first shown the new variety of toys he could get for play-
ing this game. Then he was told: 
Now, I saw that you know how to find a penny. 
In this next game, you'll have to think again 
where you can find the penny each time I weigh 
two things; but you'll also have to remember 
where you thought it was, until I can show you 
if you were right. You watch • • • 
Following the transitivity task, the child was shown whether 
he had actually found the token. The accumulated tokens 
were then exchanged for one of the prizes. 
Subjects who did not succeed on all six tasks were 
not included in the experimental sample. This was intro-
duced as a control to insure that during the experimental 
transitivity tasks, where the three objects were also of 
different size, there existed for all subjects two alterna-
tives in solving each problem: one based on perceptual eon-
figurations, the other on the premise of transitive combin-
ativity. 
For all transitivity-of-weight tasks, whether in 
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the experimental sessions or in the screening ones, con-
trols were introduced to avoid position responding by 
alternating the right-left position of A and C in the last 
step. To avoid favoring a response to A as always the 
heaviest, since always presented first, the series A> B) C 
was alternately reversed. Thus the odd-numbered tasks 
started C, B, A. 
c. In order.to get a baseline as to the sub-
ject's evaluation of weight according to size, the last 
step of the second session was carried out, as follows: 
Children in the interrogation method group were 
asked whether, without weighing, they could guess which, 
in a series of four pairs of objects, of unequal size, was 
the heavier. Their guesses were then checked on a balance. 
Children in the discrimination method group were 
asked whether, without weighing, they could guess in which 
of the two unequalsized pairs the token could be found. 
Then they were permitted to verify their judgments. 
The two foregoing sessions allowed for the selec-
tion of the 30 subjects out of the 236 screened. Only 
these 30 were further seen during the third and fourth ex-
perimental sessions. 
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The Third and Fourth Sessions. Eighteen experi-
mental transitivity-of-weight tasks were administered in 
each of these sessions; instructions similar to those in 
the typical transitivity-of-weight tasks were used. The 
subjects were warned, however, that they would not get 
the opportunity to check, after each item, the validity of 
their solutions. The examiner made it clear that a record 
of the performance was being kept. 
The interrogation-method group were told that at 
the end of the session they would be informed of the number 
of correct answers given. 
The discrimination-method group were told that at 
the end of the session they would be informed of the number 
of tokens earned. 
This procedure was introduced to prevent learn-
ing during the experimental sessions. 
In these experimental transitivity tasks, the 
three forms in each of the six geometric shapes were also 
of three different sizes (L denoted large, M denoted medium, 
S denoted small size). The dimension of size provided 
the perceptual-configuration aspect by which the problem 
could be solved, when the heaviest of the three objects 
was not also the largest, but medium or small in size: e.g., 
A-M> B-S > C-L or A-S) B-M) C-L. There were three possible 
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~elations between size and weight. They were all included 
in order to avoid the direct learning that the smallest of 
the three objects was either always the heaviest or always 
the lightest. The three possible relationships between 
size and weight, where A >B > C, constituted the three types 
of transitivity tasks. They were included in equal propor-
tion and presented in a mixed succession in the total of 
thirty-six tasks. 
"Incompatible" Tasks. Size and weight were nega-
tively correlated in these tasks. Thus the smallest object, 
s, was the heaviest; the medium object, M, was medium in 
weight; the largest object, L, was the lightest. There 
were twelve incompatible tasks, all consisting of the fol-
lowing size-weight relationship: S 2M> L. 
"Neutral" Tasks. In these tasks size varied in-
dependently of weight, with the following size-weight rela-
tionships: S > L > M, M '> L > S, L > S) M, M > S > L. There were 
twelve neutral tasks, and for the purpose of this design, 
in the following arrangements: 4 were S > L > ;Mi 2 were 
M ) L) S; 4 were L) S) M; 2 were M) S > L. 
"Compatible" Tasks. Size and weight were posi-
tively correlated in these tasks. Thus the largest object, 
L, was also the heaviest, and only one size-weight arrange-
ment was possible: L> M )S. Twelve compatible tasks were 
used. 
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The six different geometric shapes for a set of 
tasks combined with nine possible colors for each of the 
objects fUrther guarded against exact perceptual replica-
tion. 
In this experiment the heaviest object has always 
been designated as A and the lightest as· C; the correct 
solution was the judgment that A was heavier than c. Any 
other solution was considered incorrect. The total score 
was expected to be different for subjects who relied on the 
premise that A was heavier than B and that B was heavier 
than c, as opposed to those who were bound by the perceptual 
configuration of the immediate situation, that since C might 
be larger than A, it would also be heavier. However, while 
all thirty-six tasks allowed for correct and incorrect 
solutions, it was expected that if subjects were consistent 
in all answers, there would be most variability in the 
scores of the eighteen tasks (all twelve- 11 Incompatible 11 
. . 
and six "Neutral" tasks) where solutions ba.sed on percep-
tual configurations would be different from solutions 
based on premises. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE RESULTS 
This chapter includes the experimental results 
bearing on the three hypotheses, as well as the rational 
for the use of statistical analysis chosen. 
Hypotheses 
Method of Analysis 
The original design allowed for an analysis of 
variance with a parametric F test of significance. The 
data (Appendix B) were therefore examined towards this 
end. 
Departure from normality and heterogeneity of 
variances was suggested by the fact that standard devia-
tions in each group tended to be proportional to the cor-
responding means (Table 2). A transformation to logarith-
mic scale was therefore performed, and the newly transformed 
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TABLE 2 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF INCORRECT SCORES 
P-GROUP 
INTERROGATION 
S-GROUP 
INTERROGATION 
I* TASKS 
s 
8.2 3.65 
0.9 1. 20 
-lr I=INCOMP ATIBLE N=NEUTRAL 
N* 'TASKS C-It- TASKS 
s -X s 
5.2 2.09 2.4 3.84 
0.8 0.87 1.2 1.40 
C:CO:MPATIBLE 
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qata were tested for homogeneity of variance. The Bartlett 
test as described by Edwards43 ' was used. The obtained val-
ue of x2 of 11.47 with three degrees of freedom was signifi-
cant at the 0.01 probability level. The hypothesis of samp-
ling from a common population with homogeneous variance was 
rejected. The samples were therefore thought to be hetero-
geneous in variance and departing from normality. The data 
failed to meet the requirements of an analysis of variance, 
and therefore a non-parametric statistical analysis was used. 
Since non-parametric techniques could not use all 
available data, an attempt was made to have only two major 
task categories: 11 Incompatible11 and "Compatible". This 
was made possible by collapsing half of the "Neutral" tasks 
with the "Incompatible" tasks, those neutral tasks whose 
size-weight relationships were incompatible, and the other 
half with the "Compatible" tasks, since their size-weiSb.t 
relationship was compatible. The incorrect scores on the 
original and on the revised "Incompatible" and "Compatible" 
tasks were then compared. Inspection suggested that the 
incorrect scores were in similar prop0rtion in the original 
and revised task categories (Appendix D). 
43 A. L. Edwards. ~erimental design in psycholosical 
research. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1950. Chapter 
11. 
Results of statistical analysis 
The first hypothesis tested in this experiment 
stated that: 
In the concrete operational stage, when solving 
problems that offer both perceptual and logical cues, child-
ren with an empirical orientation err more often than child-
ren with a deductive orientation. 
In terms of the operations performed to test it, 
the prediction was that subjects in the P group have more 
incorrect scores than subjects in the S group in solving 
transitivity-of-weight problems that offer perceptual cues 
in addition to logical cues. This prediction was confirmed; 
the P group made 158 errors, while the S group made 29 errors. 
The significance of this difference was tested 
using Wilcoxon's Test of Significance for Unpaired Repli-
cates.44 On the basis of the number of incorrect scores, 
the sum of ranks for the P group=l52 was compared to the sum 
of ranks for the S group:58. The valu.e of T=58.o was signi-
ficant at the 0.01 probability level. This indicated that 
the difference in the number of incorrect responses given 
by the two groups cannot be attributed to chance, but rather 
to the independent variable. 
44 F. Wilcoxon. Some rapid approximate statistical pro-
cedures. New York: American Cyanamid Company, 1949. 
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The second hypothesis tested further stated that: 
Children with an empirical orientation make more 
of their errors where perception directly contradicts logic 
than children with a deductive orientation. 
Again, in terms of the operations per~or.med 1 it 
was predicted that in solving transitivity-of-weight prob-
lems, subjects in the P group would give proportionately 
more incorrect responses on "Incompatible" tasks than on 
"Compatible" tasks, when compared to subjects in the S 
group. This prediction was confirmed; the P group gave 
proportionately more incorrect scores on these tasks, with 
a sum of ranks = 135, as compared to the sum of ranks for 
the S group = 75. The significance of this difference was 
tested using Wilcoxon's Test of Significance for Unpaired 
Replicates. 45 On the baais of proportion scores of 
"Incompatible" incorrect scores to the total incorrect 
scores, the obtained value of T=75 was significant at the 
0.05 probability level. This indicated that the difference 
in the kinds of mistakes the two groups made cannot be 
attributed to chance, but rather to the independent variable. 
The third hypothesis which was tested stated that: 
Children rely on logical operations more often 
45 F. Wilcoxon. Some rapid approximate statistical pro-
cedures. New York: American Cyanamid Company, 1949. 
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when the tasks are presented by a discrimination method than 
when they are presented by an interrogation method. 
In terms of the operations performed, it was pre-
dicted that subjects of the S group who were presented with 
the experimental tasks by a discrimination method would have 
fewer incorrect responses than those of the S group who were 
presented with these tasks by an interrogation method. 
This prediction was not suppo,rted by Wilcoxon 1 s 
Test of Significance for Unpaired Replicates. 46 The value 
for T=l02.5 was not significant at the 0.05 probability level. 
Additional Findings 
Descriptive Results 
In the process of assigning the thirty subjects 
to the three experimental groups, observations on the 236 
screened subjects, were collected and are of interest. 
These children came from six kindergarten classes and five 
first grade classes in three different schools (Appendix E). 
The experimental sample of 30 children (N=30) 
represented 12.12% of the total sample which was screened. 
Of these, the N:lO in the P group made up 4.02%, while the 
N=20 in the S groups represented 8.10%. 
46 F. Wilcoxon. Some rapid approximate statistical pro-
cedures. New York: American· Cyanamid Company, 1949. 
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Of the 236 subjects screened, 152 were eliminated 
on the basis of failing the conservation-of-weight tasks 
(65.3%). Of the 83 who passed the tasks (34.7%), 23 were 
assigned to a P group (9.3%) and 60 were assigned to an S 
group ( 25. 5%). 
Qualitative Results 
In seven of the eight conservation-of-weight 
tasks, the transformation of the plasticine ball led to a 
difference in shape. However, in the eighth task the 
transformation also resulted in a more dramatic change 
shape. It was surmised that for subjects who solved the 
first seven tasks, giving either "P" or "S" explanations, 
the eighth task would present a special case. The responses 
were therefore examined in the 83 subjects who had succeeded 
in the conservation-of-weight test. Only 13 of these 
showed a change in the response to item 8. Ten subjects 
failed this last item following seven successes, and one 
subject.gave a "P" explanation following four consecutive 
11 8 11 explanations. There were only tw·o subjects who improved 
their performances on this eighth item, by giving an 11 8 11 
explanation following seven consecutive 11P11 explanations. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
In an attempt to clarify the relation between 
perceptually bound and logically dictated thinking, this 
thesis focussed on the supremacy of misleading perception 
in the concrete operational stage. A general hypothesis 
was formulated in terms of a functional relation between 
perception and an empirical orientation: 
The supremacy of misleading perception is a 
function of empirical orientation during the concrete 
operational stage. It is more evident in investigations 
that use interrogation rather than discrimination methods. 
Positive Findings 
Two aspects of the general hypothesis were 
verified: 
Children in the concrete operational stage, al-
though having demonstrated the ability to use logic, still 
-49-
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persisted in their reliance on perceptual configurations 
if they were empirically oriented. This reliance on per-
ception became increasingly evident where perception con-
tradicted logic. 
Within the limitations of one study and its oper-
ational definitions, a number of implications emerge: 
The dominance of misleading perception continues 
into areas where concrete operational thinking is already 
evident. This interaction between perception and cognition 
has two aspects. First, logical thinking does not always 
correct deceiving perception, although it may do so, as 
shown by earlier studies. Secondly, in the presence of 
operational structures, perception can gover.n thinking. 
In emphasizing that more advanced modes of think-
ing integrate previous ones, Piaget has been explicit pri-
marily about one dimension in cognitive development: its 
forward movement. The progression from one mode of think-
ing to the next can now be considered to proceed alomg var-
ious dimensions.. There is the possibility of a residue of 
former modes of thinking which are still used in certain 
situations. Inhelder's theoretical speculation that older 
modes of thinking are abandoned in favor of newer ones ~lso 
has to be modified. Further research might examine whether 
older modes of thinking persist together with newly ac-
quired ones at all phases of cognitive development. 
In his description of the establishment of opera-
tional thinking in one concrete area at a time, Piaget ac-
tually talks about a gradual taking over of logical think-
ing. The change from perceptual to operational thinking in 
one specific concrete area also appears to be gradual. This 
is indicated by the interaction between perception and logic 
where there is an alternating dominance of the older and 
newer modes of thinking. Future research might examine 
whether in other areas of the concrete operational stage 
(e.g. weight, volume) there is this same type of gradual 
change to logical thinking. 
47 
Smedslund classified "P" explanations of' solu-
tiona t0 conservation-of-weight problems as failures. The 
present study suggests that these 11P11 explanations, desig-
nating an empirical orientation, may not be real failures, 
- since they are found in the context of operational thinking. 
However, the empirical orientation, which was functionally 
related to misleading perception in the stage of concrete 
operations may itself represent an intermediate step to 
the acquisition of logical thinking. It appears similar 
48 
to Smedslund's empirical learning, which was qualitatively 
47 
48 
J. Smedslund. Learnin~ and equilibration. Unpublished 
manuscript. Oslo, 195 • 
J. Smedslund.. Apprentissage des notions de la conserva-
tion et de la transitivite du poids. Etudes~· ~., 
vol. IX. p. 85-124. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France; 1959. 
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different from normally acquired logical ways of solving 
problems. Future research could elucidate whether the 
empirical approach represents an intermediate level in 
the acquisition of operational structuring. Or it may be 
that the empirical orientation, as defined by this experi-
ment, is itself a variable, representing an excessive reli-
ance on perception, which continues in a subtle manner 
throughout cognitive organization and is functionally rela-
ted to other variables. 
Nesative findinss 
The interrogation method was compared with the 
discrimination method in deductively oriented children, and 
there was no difference in the results. This shows that the 
'uncontrollable factors in the interrogation method, to which 
Brain refers, do not conceal the reasoning ability involved 
in the transitivity tasks. 
The generality of these findings is limited 
because: 
a. A real significance of the findings might 
have been concealed by a ceiling effect. There was no room 
for either method to show superiority, since the subje~ts .. 
tested by both methods performed close to perfection •. 
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b. Brain used the discrimination method in a 
normative study ~n detecting an earlier age level for the 
emergence of an ability. However, the present experiment 
went a step further in predicting that the method would 
also facilitate the use of an already existing ability in 
a complex situation. It is possible that the discrepancy 
can be expected only in normative studies. 
c. This study provided no comparison between 
the use of candy as a reinforcer, as Brain did, and the 
present cafeteria type of reward. Future research should 
also include a direct comparison of these two types of 
reward in the discrimination method. 
Brain's discrimination method may also be suited 
to investigations similar to those in the present experi-
ment, but carried out on a population with uneven verbal 
development. 
Additional findings 
The present study, having scanned 236 subjects 
between the ages of 5 years 3 months and 7 years, also 
included some normative data in the area of conservation-
of-weight. This data was collected by Smedslund's49 stan-
49 J. Smedslund. Learning and equilibration. Unpublished 
manuscript. Oslo, 1959. 
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dardized verbal method, allowing for a direct comparison 
with his findings. On closer inspection, of the 34.7% of 
I 
the children who performed correctly (beyond chance), only 
those who gave "S" explanations could be contrasted'with 
Smedslund's findings, since he considered as failures those 
' 
who gave 11P" explanations. With a smaller sample (N=l35) 
than the one used in this study (N=236), his findings of 
20% successes between the ages of 5 years 6 months and 7 
years compared favorably to the 25.4% figure in the present 
study. In the light of previous objections to verbal 
methods as being too vagu.e, such findings would indicate 
that Smedslund's standardization of Piaget's procedure is 
precise enough to allow for communication and replication. 
Also pointing to future research are some of the 
qualitative findings. The change which occurred on the 
eighth conservation-of-weight task was mostly a shift from 
conservation to non-conservation. However, two subjects 
shifted from "P" to "S" explanations on the last item, in 
which the trans~or.med ball was radically discrepant from 
the unaltered. on.e. The previously consistent reliance on 
empirical data in explaining that the two balls still weigh 
the "same" because "they look alike", did not O.Perate in 
giving the explanation during the eighth item. One may 
question whether a "P" explanation was too incongruous with 
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the reality of the eighth transformed ball, and the conflict 
in the situation led to a "deductive", 11 811 explanation. 
The aspect that could be further studied is whether this 
shift in the face of conflict is a function of a progression 
in cognitive development. 
Another question was raised, this time about the 
subjects who failed the typical transitivity tasks during 
the screening sessions. Would the P and S groups still 
differ on the experimental tasks, according to the predic-
tions~made in the hypothesis, after the training on typical 
transitivity problems? A possible experimental design was 
' 
thus considered in a pilot study (Appendix F). 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis examined the relationship between 
thinking dominated by perception and thinking guided by 
logic. It was suggested by Piaget's theory of cognitive 
development, which defines modes of thinking in terms of 
logical forms as models of operation of the mind. Thus 
thinking unfolds in several stages, each characterized by 
a precursor of logic. 
Within this theoretical framelvork, the present 
study focussed on the supremacy of misleading perception 
at the onset of the concrete operational stage. The 
relationship between perception and logic was examined in 
a situation where they were incompatible. 
Thinking is bound by perception up to and during 
the intuitive stage, just preceding the concrete operational 
stage. Piaget's view is that perception with its "centering" 
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effects--inconsistencies and distortions--tends to hinder 
early forms of thinking, which lack unifying stability. 
In problem-solving it is reflected in an empirical approach. 
As the rudiments of logical--concrete operational--thinking 
gain primacy, the child takes into account other sources 
of information apart from those predominantly perceptual. 
A reliance on operational thinking can compensate for any 
change in perception, and a deductive approach to problem-
solving becomes possible~ 
The intuitive and the.concrete operational modes 
of thinking, perceptually and logically guided, have been 
investigated in studies on children lacking operational 
structures. Attempts to teach the subjects to solve 
problems involving logic led, at best, to empirical learn-
ing. Although the newly acquired skill was correct for 
the particular situation, it lacked the underlying logical 
principles. The empirical approach to problem-solving was 
found to persist throughout the intuitive stage, being re-
placed by deductive problem-solving in the concrete opera-
tional phase of thinking. 
These experiments considered only one variable: 
the absence of operational thinking. Furthermore, they 
showed that in the presence of concrete operational think-
ing, there is an imposition of logic on the perceptual 
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organization in a purely perceptual task. What has not 
been examined is the imposition of perce~tion-dictated 
thinking on a deductive task once concrete operational 
thinking has been reached. Also, in these studies, the 
alternative perceptual and logical cues were not simul-
taneously present. 
Piaget 1 s early, flexible, verbal method of re-
search had been systematized and allowed replication. It 
was still a verbal method, and as such, raised certain 
objections. Brain, in discussing these, distinguished 
between behavioral and verbal manifestations of a concept, 
which were obscured in Piaget's technique. Brain therefore 
used a discrimination method in an experiment finding con-
crete operations available at an age at least two years 
prior to the norm where Piaget located their emergence. 
However, this comparison is not entirely satisfactory, for 
Brain used no directly parallel interrogation method in the 
same experiment. 
· The relationship between perceptually dominated 
and logically guided thinking was therefore examined in a 
situation where perceptual configuarations and logic com-
peted. The investigation was carried out during a period 
in the child's development which Piaget had described as 
transitional between intuitive and operational thinking, 
five to seven years. 
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The subjects, however, demonstrated having the rudiments 
of operational thinking, but differed in their reliance 
on empirical laws in problem-solving. 
The following general hypothesis was stated: 
The supremacy of misleading perception is a 
function of empirical orientation during the concrete 
operational stage. It is more evident in investigations 
that use interrogation rather than discrimination methods. 
In this study, one aspect of perception--primary 
reliance on perception of size, competed with one charac-
teristic of operational thinking--transitivity as applied 
to weight (in the weight relationship of three objects, A 
was heavier than B and B was heavier than C; it was there-
fore infe·rred that A was heavier than C). In the experi.:.. 
mental transitivity tasks, the largest object was heaviest, 
lightest or medium in weight, providing the perceptual 
cues. 
The explanations given for successful performan-
ces on the conservation-of-weight tasks operationally de-
fined the first independent variable: an empirical orien-
tation and a deductive orientation. Two groups were 
chosen to represent this variable: the P group (empiri-
cally oriented) and the S group (deductively oriented). 
~he mode of presentation of the test tasks, an 
i~terrogation method and a discrimination method, repre-
sented the dichotomized second independent variable. Two 
groups, the S group-interrogation and the S group-discrim-
ination, represented this variable. 
The quantification of the performance on the 
experimental transitivity tasks, which also allowed for 
a reliance on perceptual cues, served as the operational 
measure of the dependent variable. 
Out of the 236 children who were screened, 30 
subjects qualified during the first two sessions as pos-
sessing some rudiments of concrete operational thinking, 
and were categorized as having either an empirical or a 
deductive orientation. They also showed the ability to 
rely on logical premises in the successful solution of 
typical transitivity tasks, where the three objects were 
of the same size. During the following two sessions in 
solving the experimental transitivity-of-weight problems, 
they were given the ?PPortunity to rely either on percep-
tion or on logical premises. The subjects were thus 
assigned to the three experimental groups: empirically 
oriented - interrogation method, deductively oriented -
interrogation method, and deductively oriented - discrim-
ination method. Statistical tests showed that chrono-
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~ogical age and male-female distributions were not signi-
ficantly different for the three experimental groups. 
The Wilcoxon Test of Significance for Unpaired 
Replicates was the statistical analysis used for the three 
specific hypotheses (incorporated in the general hypothesis). 
1. In the concrete operational stage, when solv-
ing problems that offer both perceptual and logical cues, 
children with an empirical orientation err more often than 
children with a deductive orientation. 
This first hypothesis was confirmed; in analyzing 
the data a T value of 58 was obtained, signifieant' at the 
0.01 probability level. 
2. In such problems, children with an empirical 
orientation make more of their errors where perception 
directly contradicts logic than children with a deductive 
orientation. 
This second hypothesis was confirmed a value 
for T=75 was significant at the 0.05 probability level. 
3. In problems which offer both perceptual and 
logical cues, children rely on logical operations more 
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pften when the tasks are presented by a discrimination 
method than when they are presented by an interrogation 
method. 
This hypothesis was not confirmed; the value 
for T=l02.5 was not significant at the 0.05 probability 
level. Here a real significance of the findings might 
have been concealed by a ceiling effect. There was no 
room for either method to show superiority, since the 
subjects tested by both methods approached the maximum 
possible score. 
Within the limitations of this study certain 
generalizations emerge. In the concrete operational stage, 
perception may mislead even in areas where logical think-
ing is already manifest. Though logic may correct decep-
-
tive perception, it does not necessarily do so. 
Piaget has emphasized only one dimension in 
cognitive growth, with more advanced modes of thinking 
. 
integrating previous ones. This progress is now seen 
along various dimensions, with the possibility of_ a resi-
due of former modes of thinking being used in certain 
situations. 
The interaction between perception and logic 
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with an alternating dominance of the older and newer modes 
of thinking indicates that the change to operational think-
ing in at least one concrete operational area is gradual. 
Future research might examine whether in other areas of 
the concrete operational stage there is the same type of 
gradual change to l0gical thinking, and whether this alter-
nating dominance of older and newer structures may mark all 
phases of cognitive development~ 
The empirical orientation, which was functionally 
related to misleading perception in this stage, may itself 
represent an intermediate step in acquiring the concrete 
operational structu're. 
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APPENDIX A 
SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF AGES 
-_66-
AFPENDIX A 
SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF AGES 
~OURCE OF VARIATION 
BETWEEN GROUPS 
WITHIN GROUPS 
TOTAL 
2 
27 
29 
df F 
18.07 9.035 .. __ _ 
881.30 30.389 
889.37 
not significant 
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NUMBER OF INCORRECT SCORES 
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APPENDIX B 
NUMBER OF INCORRECT SCORES 
P GROUP - INTERROGATION 
I* TASKS NiE- TASKS C* TASKS TOTAL 
Male F. F. 5 7 7 19 Subj. #1 
Female N. c. 7 6 7 20 
Subj. #2 
Female s. D. 11 5 0 16 
Subj. #3 
Female J. G. 12 6 0 18 
Subj. #4 
Male J. w. 12 4 0 16 
Subj. #5 
Female s. s. 6 7 7 20 
Subj. #6 
Male L. B. 3 1 0 4 
Subj. #7 
Female V. P. 7 5 6 18 
Subj. #8 
Male J. s. 11 4 0 15 
Subj. #9 
Female R. w. 8 4 0 12 
Subj. #10 
i£- I - INCOMPATIBLE N - NEUTRAL C - COMPATIBLE 
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APPENDIX B 
NUMBER OF INCORRECT SCORES 
S GROUP - INTERROGATION 
I* TASKS N* TASKS C-lf TASKS TOTAL 
Male K. K. 1 0 0 1 
Subj. #1 
Male R. L. 1 0 3 4 
Subj. #2 
MaleR. d'A. 0 1 0 1 
suoj: #3 
Female E. R. 0 2 2 4 
Subj.· #4 
Female s. c. 3 3 1 7 
Subj •. #5 
Male L. B. 3 0 0 3 
Subj. #6 
Male s. B. 0 0 1 1 
Subj. #7 
Male B. c. 1 1 4 6 
Subj. #8 
Male H. D. 0 1 1 2 
Subj. #9 
Female R. s. 0 0 0 0 
Subj. #10 
* I - INCOMPATIBLE N - NEUTRAL C - COMPATIBLE 
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APPENDIX B 
NUMBER OF INCORRECT SCORES 
S GROUP - DISCRIMINATION 
I* TASKS N* TASKS C* TASKS TOTAL 
Male R. c. 0 0 0 0 
Subj. #1 
Female J. s. 0 3 0 3 
Subj. #2 
Female E. J. s~ 2 2 1 5 
Subj. #3 
Female L. B. 1 1 0 2 
Subj. #4 
Male R. w. 0 1 0 1 
Subj. #5 
Male B. W. 0 1 0 1 
Subj. #6 
Female A. B. 0 2 1 3 
Subj. #7 
Male R. Y. 0 0 0 0 
Subj. #8 
Male B. A. 2 0 1 3 
Subj. #9 
Male G. R. 0 2 3 5 
Subj. #10 
* I - INCOMPATIBLE N - NEUTRAL C - COMPATIBLE 
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APPENDIX C 
BARTLETT'S TEST OF HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE FOR 
P GROUP - INTERROGATION AND S GROUP - INTERROGATION 
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APPENDIX 0 
BARTLETT 1 S TEST OF HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE FOR 
P GROUP - INTERROGATION AND S GROUP - INTERROGATION 
GROUPS d. f. s2 log s2 
E group - I* tasks 9 31,007.96 4.4914 
P group -. Co!!- tasks 9 291,682.49 5.4496 
S group - I* tasks 9 86,285.34 4.9359 
S group - C* tasks 9 75,049.82 4.8753 
Sum. 484,025.61 19.7522 
x2 COMPUTATIONS 
1.~.= 484,025.61 = 121,006.4; log?s2 = 5.0828 
r r 
2. r [log~~_l= (4)(5.0828) = 20.3312 
3. Diff.= r [log[~]- log • 2 = 20.3312 - 19.7522 = .5790 
4. x2 = (2.3026)(n-l)(Diff)=(2.3026)(9)(5790) = 11.997 
5. Correction = l+r+l 1+4+1 
(3)(r)(n-1) = (3)(4)(9) = 1.046 
6. Corrected x2 = x2/correct. = 11.997/1.046 = 11.469 
x2 = 11.47 p (0.01 
* I - INCOMPATIBLE C - COMPATIBLE 
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APPENDIX D 
INCORRECT SCORES ON ORIGINAL AND REVISED TASK CATEGORIES 
P GROUP - INTERROGATION 
INCOMPATIBLE TASKS COMPATIBLE TASKS 
ORIGINAL REVISED ORIGINAL REVISED 
5 10 7 9 
7 8 7 12 
11 16 0 0 
12 18 0 0 
12 16 0 0 
6 11 7 9 
3 4 0 0 
7 8 6 10 
11 15 0 0 
8 12 0 0 
TOTAL 82 118 27 40 
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APPENDIX D 
INCORRECT SCORES ON ORIGINAL AND REVISED TASK CATEGORIES 
S GROUP - INTERROGATION 
INCOMPATIBLE TASKS COMPATIBLE TASKS 
ORIGINAL REVISED ORIGINAL REVISED 
1 1 0 0 
1 1 3 3 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 2 4 
3 6 1 1 
3 3 0 0 
0 0 1 1 
1 2 4 4 
0 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 9 14 12 15 
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APPENDIX D 
INCORRECT SCORES ON ORIGINAL AND REVISED TASK CATEGORIES 
S GROUP - DISCRIMINATION 
INCOMPATIBLE TASKS COMPATIBLE TASKS 
ORIGINAL REVISED ORI:GINAL REVISED 
0 0 0 0 
0 2 0 1 
2 3 1 2 
1 2 0 0 
0 1 0 3 
0 1 0 0 
0 1 1 2 
0 0 0 0 
2 1 1 1 
0 0 3 5 
-
TOTAL 5 9 6 14 
'. 
APPENDIX E 
SCHOOL SOURCE OF THE TOTAL SAMPLE 
N = 236 
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School 
' 
s 
M 
B 
Tptal 
APPENDIX E 
SCHOOL SOURCE OF THE TOTAL SAMPLE 
N'= 236 
Kindergarten 
72 
65 
45 
182 
lst Grade 
36 
18 
54 
Total 
108 
65 
63 
236 
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AE'PENDIX F 
P.ILOT STUDY ON TRAINING IN TRANSITIVITY-OF-WEIGHT 
Additional data was collected in keeping with 
questions raised during the reported experimental study. 
More specifically, a question was focussed on 
the subjects who originally failed on typical transitivity 
tasks (during the screening session). Would the P and S 
groups differ on the experimental tasks according to the 
predictions made in the hypothesis following training on 
typical transitivity-of-weight tasks? 
The procedure was similar to that described in 
the main experiment. The P and S groups formed four sub-
groups according to the method of presentation: P Group-
Interrogation, P Group-Discrimination, S Group-Interrogation 
and S Group-Discrimination. Following their failure on the 
screening tasks, they were trained on nine typical transi-
tivity-of-weight tasks. Another try at the six screening 
tasks determined whether they were to continue in this 
pilot study. If they met the criterion of complete success 
(six out of six tasks passed), they returned for two addi-
tional sessions and performed on the experimental transiti-
vity tasks. 
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Of the nineteen subjects in this additional sam-
ple, thirteen failed to meet the criterion. Of these, four 
belonged to the P group and nine to the S group. Of the 
six subjects accepted in the final pilot sample, two were 
of the P group and four of the S group. 
The results on the experimental transitivity 
tasks for this N=6 were inspected and not statistically 
analyzed {Appendix F - Form 1). The proportion of incor-
rect responses was higher in the P group than in the S 
group. This trend was in the same direction as the statis-
tically significant results of the main study in which the 
empirically oriented group made more mistakes than the 
deductively oriented group. It would therefore be inter-
esting to enlarge this pilot study. 
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APPENDIX F - FORM 1 
!NCORRECT SCORES FOR SIX SUBJECTS IN THE PILOT-STUDY 
I 
P GROUP 
I~TERROGATION DISCRIMINATION 
Subj. T. L. Subj. S. R. 
20 10 
a GROUP 
INTERROGATION DISCRIMINATION 
Subj. S. E. Subj. J. H. 
3 1 
Subj. K. B. Subj. C. B. 
1 11 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examined the relationship between 
thinking dominated by perception and thinking guided by 
logic. It was suggested by Piaget•s theory of cognitive 
development which defines modes of thinking in terms of 
logical forms as models of operation of the mind. Thus 
thinking unfolds in several stages, each characterized 
by a precursor of logic. 
Within this theoretical framework, the present 
study focussed on the supremacy of misleading perception 
at the onset of the concrete operational stage. The 
relationship was examined in a situation of incompatibility 
between perception and logic. 
Thinking is bound by perception up to and during 
the intuitive stage, just preceding the concrete operation-
al stage. Piaget's view is that perception with its 
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"·centering11 effect--inconsistencies and distortions--tends 
to hinder early forms of thinking, which lack unifying sta-
bility. In problem-solving it is reflected in an empiri-
cal approach. As the rudiments of logical--concrete 
operational--thinking gain primacy, the child takes into 
account other sources of information apart from those pre-
dominantly perceptual. A reliance on operational thinking 
can compensate for any change in perception, and a deduc-
tive approach to problem-solving becomes possible. 
In unsuccessful attempts to teach children to 
solve logical problems, investigations on the relationship 
between perception and logic considered only one variable: 
the absence of concrete operational thinking. In the pre-
sence of operational thinking, studies had focussed pri-
marily on purely perceptual tasks and the extent to which 
logic imposed on the perceptual organization. What had not 
been examined was the imposition of perception-dictated 
thinking on a deductive task once concrete operational 
thinking had been reached. Also, in these studies, the 
' 
alternative perceptual and logical cues were not simul-
taneously present. 
Discrimination methods in experiments on opera-
. 
tional thinking detected the ability to use logic prior to 
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~he period when it was found to emerge in experiments using 
Fiaget 1 s verbal-interrogation method. However, this compar-
ison is not entirely satisfactory since these studies did 
not directly parallel interrogation and discrimination 
methods. 
The relationship between perceptually dominated 
and logically guided thinking was therefore examined in a 
situation where perceptual configurations and logic com-
peted. The investigation was carried out during a period 
in the child's development which Piaget had described as 
transitional between intuitive and operational thinking, 
five to seven years. The subjects, however, demonstrated 
' having the rudiments of operational thinking, but differed 
in their reliance on empirical laws in problem-solving. 
The following general hypothesis was stated: 
The supremacy of misleading perception is a 
function of empirical orientation during the concrete 
operational stage. It is more evident in investigations 
that use interrogation rather than discrimination methods. 
In this study, one aspect of perception, primary 
reliance on perception of size, competed with one charac-
teristic of operational thinking, transitivity as applied 
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to weight ( in the weight relationship of three objects, A 
was heavier than B and B was heavier than C; it was there-
fore inferred that A was heavier than C ). In these exper-
imental transitivity tasks, the largest object was heaviest, 
lightest, or medium in weight, providing opportunity to 
rely on perceptual cues. 
The Wilcoxon Test of Significance for Unpaired 
Replicates was the statistical analysis used for the three 
specific hypotheses (incorporated in the general hypothesis). 
1. In the concrete operational stage, when sol-
ving problems that offer both perceptual and logical cues, 
children with an empirical orientation err more often than 
children with a deductive orientation. 
This first hypothesis was confirmed; in analyzing 
the data, a T value of 58 was obtained, significant at the 
0.01 probability level. 
2. In such problems, children with an empirical 
orientation make more of their errors where perception 
directly contradicts logic than children with a deductive 
orientation. 
This second hypothesis was confirmed a value 
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for T=75 was significant at the 0.05 probability level. 
3. · In problems which offer both perceptual and 
logical cues, children rely on logical operations more often 
when the tasks are presented by a discrimination method than 
when they are presented by an interrogation method. 
This hypothesis was not confirmed; the value for 
T=l02.5 was not significant at the 0.05 probability level. 
Here a real significance of the findings might have been 
concealed by a ceiling effect. There was no room for 
either method to show superiority, since the subjects tested 
by both methods approached the maximum possible score. 
Within the limitations of this study, certain 
generalizations emerge. In the concrete operational stage, 
perception may mislead even in areas where logical thinking 
is already manifest. Though logic may correct deceptive 
perception, it does not necessarily do so. 
Piaget has emphasized only one dimension in 
cognitive growth, with more advanced modes of thinking 
integrating previous ones. This progress is now seen along 
various dimensions with the possibility of a residue of 
former modes of thinking being used in certain situations. 
-92- ' 
~he interaction between perception and logic with 
an alternating dominance of the older and newer modes of 
thinking indicates that the change to operational thinking, 
at least in one concrete operational area, is gradual. 
Future research might examine whether in.other areas of the 
concrete operational stage, there is the same type of 
gradual change to logical thinking, and whether this alter-
nating dominance of older and newer structures may mark all 
phases of cognitive development. 
The empirical orientation, which was functionally 
related to misleading perception in this stage, may itself 
represent an intermediate step in acquiring the concrete 
operational structure. 
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